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 A unique feature that can be observed in the statutes creating central banks has 
been the restriction, or sometimes the total prohibition, imposed on them in getting 
directly involved in economic activities. This restriction has stemmed from another 
unique feature inherent with central banks: the power to acquire assets by raising their 
liabilities at will. If this power is irresponsibly exercised by a central bank, the 
consequential outcome would be to inflate the economy and through that process, 
destabilize the macro-economy. The underlying costs, both short term and long term, are 
so widespread that the drafters of central bank statutes have not taken a chance with 
regard to the options available. This has led them to confine central banks to their core 
objective of attaining and maintaining price stability and constrain them from pursuing 
multiple objectives that would act counter to this main objective. 
 
 The main distinction between a central bank and an ordinary economic entity, or 
for that matter even the government, stems from this unique feature. Whereas a central  
_______________________ 
* 
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on South Asian 
Investment and Trade Co-operation organised by the SAARC. Chamber of Commerce 
and IBA at Karachi in January 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
bank could raise both its assets and liabilities simultaneously, an ordinary economic 
entity cannot do so at its will. It could at most do only the exchanging of one asset for 
another type of asset or using an asset to discharge a liability. In the first place, the 
adjustment is only on the asset side and there is no change in the total assets or liabilities. 
In the latter case, both assets and liabilities would decline simultaneously. An ordinary 
entity could raise both assets and liabilities simultaneously in certain circumstances. 
However, in these cases, another entity in the economy must be willing to exchange its 
assets for a liability to be issued by the entity concerned. This is a tedious process and an 
entity is not in a position to secure it at its own will. 
 
 This distinction between a central bank and an ordinary economic entity should 
be very clearly understood, when policies are designed to use central banks for 
facilitating trade and investments. This is because when central banks get involved in real 
economic activities, they can do so only by inflating the economies. Hence, central banks 
should do only what they can do safely without inflating their respective economies. To 
fill the gap, other economic entities should be promoted to undertake real economic 
activities. This paper will identify and outline what the central banks could do and should 
do in this respect. 
 
 Part I of the paper will outline the instruments available to central banks and 
present the case for using such instruments responsibly. Part II will present the model 
within which a central bank could operate to facilitate economic development. Part III is 
devoted to a summary and conclusions. 
 
THE CENTRAL BANK INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 
 
 A central bank’s power to acquire assets by creating liabilities at will is known, in 
the general parlance, as printing of new money. From the stand-point of its impact on the 
economy, this is an over-generalization. What a central bank actually produces is not 
mere money, but seed money or reserve money that the rest of the banking system uses 
for creating further money in multiple terms. The process begins with the central bank’s 
acquisition of assets through a mere book-entry: a debit entry creating an asset is matched 
by a credit entry in its books. In this case, a central bank would assume a demand liability 
to commercial banks (both currency and current accounts) or the general public (currency 
only). These demand liabilities of a central bank are used by commercial banks to create 
further deposits (and credit as well) in multiple terms through their multiple deposit and 
credit creating mechanism by resorting to simple book-entries. The result is that every 
unit of reserve money created by a central bank ends up as a bigger volume of money in 
the hands of the public enabling them to acquire a bigger basket of goods and services in 
nominal terms. Hence, the central bank’s power to create reserve money, in actual 
practice, creates a much bigger volume of money supply, thus, giving the reserve money 
the title ‘high-powered money’. 
 
 Money leads to an expansion in an aggregate demand in nominal terms generating 
an upward movement in the general price level in the long-run. Thus, a central bank’s 
action, if used irresponsibly, brings forth long run inflation thereby defeating its prime 
objective of maintaining price stability. An uncontrolled inflation over a long-period 
infests the minds of people (who may be traders or investors) with high inflationary 
expectations. The result is disastrous for an economy’s long-term economic growth 
momentum: economic agents avoid taking a long-term view of the economy and confine 
themselves only to short-term activities. Hence, inflation kills both incentives and actions 
needed for economic growth. 
 
 A central bank could get itself engaged in economic activities only through the 
creation of high powered money or in other words, inflating the economy in the long-run. 
Its lending to the government or banks so that the latter group could generate economic 
activities would bring forth the same outcome. Long term inflation is costly to an 
economy in a number of ways: apart from compelling the economic agents to shun long-
term and prefer short-term, it re-distributes wealth from financial asset holders to 
unproductive, speculative type real asset holders; it brings the price system’s resource 
allocation role to a halt; it taxes exports and subsidises imports thereby adversely 
affecting the balance of payments; and contributes to the development of social and 
political unrest thus denying the economy much needed stability for long-term planning. 
 
 When an economy is hit by long-term inflationary tendencies, central banks are 
required to pursue anti-inflationary tight monetary policy measures. These measures 
invariably take the form of raising interest rates and curtailing credit creation so that 
uncontrolled expansion in money in the economy can be checked. Further, inflation 
reduces a country’s competitiveness vis-à-vis its competitor trading nations, requiring it 
to allow the exchange rate to depreciate continuously to maintain external sector 
equilibrium.1  
  
 High interest rates, less credit and a depreciating currency are the killers of both 
trade and investments and, therefore, should be avoided if trade and investment are to be 
promoted. Hence, a central bank’s action involving its direct participation in economic 
activities or opening its credit windows to support growth would act counter to any 
objective of facilitating trade and investment. If a central bank reduces interest rates and 
permits credit to expand in the wake of high inflationary tendencies, it constitutes a self-
defeating exercise, since, at the end, this destroys the incentive system for trade and 
investment by inflating the economy. 
 
 It is, therefore, necessary for a central bank to use its instrument of printing new 
money responsibly in order to avoid an inflationary situations and thereby preserve the 
incentive system for both trade and investment. In fact, what a central bank could do to 
facilitate trade and investment is to maintain a low inflation regime for a sufficiently long 
period and thereby eliminate high inflationary expectations in the minds of economic 
agents. This creates a conducive environment for economic agents to plan for the future, 
make investment decisions by considering a long-term perspective and take measures to 
improve productivity and through it, enhance the competitiveness of the country. Such a 
policy regime would permit a country to gain in the long-run by way of promoting both 
trade and investments2. 
 
 
 In summary, central bank credit or low interest rate regimes cannot facilitate trade 
and investment. Such a policy regime can bring forth a major destabilizing impact on an 
economy by sowing the seeds of long run inflation, thereby acting counter to the very 
objective of promoting such activities. Thus, the facilitation of trade and investment 
through inflation would end up as a self-defeating strategy in the long-run. Therefore, 
what the central banks should do is to create a conducive environment for trade and 
investments to take place autonomously, by ensuring a low inflation in the long run and, 
through it, by establishing a low interest rate regime and a stable currency. 
 
RESPONSIBLE POLICY ACTIONS BY CENTRAL BANKS 
 
As argued in the previous section, the best policy which a central bank could 
adopt to facilitate both trade and investments is the creation of a conducive environment 
for such activities to take place autonomously by maintaining a low inflation regime. 
However, within the central bank policy actions relating to the attainment of price 
stability, there is scope for facilitating trade and investment through indirect means 
without compromising the price stability objective. This involves basically two types of 
policy actions as follows: 
 
(a) Permitting  non-inflationary monetary expansion 
 (b) Lending the expertise of a central bank to the government in policy  
   formulation. 
 
(a) Non-inflationary Monetary Expansion 
  
 When the real economy grows and the liquidity requirements of the economy 
increase, a central bank has to permit the money supply to rise correspondingly so as to 
avoid disruption to economic activities emanating from liquidity shortages. Such liquidity 
shortages create uncertainty, bring about volatility in interest rates, give way for the 
wide-spread use of money substitutes and make central bank policy actions impotent and 
inoperative. Hence, central banks are required to permit the money supply to increase at 
least at the rate of growth of nominal income, i.e., real growth rate plus projected 
inflation. The underlying money supply increase is considered non-inflationary, since the 
growth in real income would raise the demand for money by the same proportion as the 
growth in money supply thereby neutralizing its impact on aggregate demand. Hence, it 
has been argued that central banks could use the leeway available to them for permitting 
non-inflationary money growth for stimulating the economy. 
 
 There are several limitations to this approach. First, the leeway available may not 
be significant, since the real growth of many economies over the long-run averages out to 
annual growth rates below 5 percent. In view of the high money multipliers ranging 
between 3 –5, an increase in money supply at 5 percent without creating inflation permits 
a central bank to expand the reserve money base by less than 2 percent per annum. 
Second, the approach assumes a unit income elasticity of the demand for money to permit 
the entirety of the money supply growth to be absorbed by  an equivalent increase in the 
demand for money. However, the demand for money functions in many developing 
economies is  highly unstable and also varies significantly from year to year. This makes 
the task of a central bank to raise reserve money by an exact amount difficult. Any excess 
creation of reserve money would therefore lead to inflation thereby foiling the central 
bank’s policy action. Third, like the income elasticity of the demand for money, the 
money multiplier too in many developing countries is highly unstable. Hence, it is not 
possible for a central bank to identify the level of non-inflationary money supply growth 
precisely. Any unpredicted rise in the money multiplier3 would cause an excessive 
monetary expansion thereby frustrating the bank’s goal of stimulating the economy in a 
non-inflationary manner. Fourth, the use of central bank’s money creating power even in 
a restricted manner is highly dangerous since the bank may not be able to say ‘no’ to the 
external pressure coming from interested groups for further expansion of its credit 
windows. Once a window is open, even for limited applications, it would be difficult to 
close the same, when the credit expansion is found to be excessive. In view of this, it is 
not advisable to use this leeway for the stimulation of the economy. 
 
 In this background, the central banks can facilitate trade and investments only 
through indirect means. 
 
  (b) Lending of Bank’s Expertise 
 
 The central banks, through continuous investment in human capital, have been 
able to amass a skilled knowledge base. This could be tapped to formulate long-term 
development policies, without running the risk of compromising its price stability 
objective. This knowledge base can be made available to the governments to formulate 
sustainable policies for promoting both trade and investments. 
 
 Expert knowledge is needed by governments for conducting negotiations with 
both bilateral and multilateral trade and investment liberalization. It is often the case that 
bureaucrats lack comprehensive knowledge of macroeconomic implications of such 
negotiations. Further, they may also not be sympathetic towards monetary stability 
objectives pursued by central banks and knowingly or unknowingly, propose measures 
that act counter to central bank policies. It has been observed that, when central bank 
officers serve on such committees, the reconciliation of divergent interests is made more 
easily. In this context, the knowledge base in central banks comes in handy. Many 
governments in developing countries have liberally tapped this source, when undertaking 
such negotiations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper argues that central banks which are statutorily required to attain and 
maintain price stability should not risk that objective by directly participating in 
economic activities. This is valid for their initiatives to facilitate both trade and 
investment. The only instrument available to a central bank is its ability to produce 
reserve money which, if produced excessively, would lead to inflation through a multiple 
expansion of money supply. Such a policy is a self-defeating exercise, since inflation 
discourages both trade and investments by compelling economic agents to take only a 
short-term view of the economies concerned. Further, to fight inflation, central banks are 
required to tighten the monetary policy by way of raising interest rates and curtailing 
credit. Both measures are inimical to the promotion of trade and long-term investment. 
Hence, a central bank should facilitate trade and investment by creating a conducive 
environment by maintaining a low inflation regime and, through it, a low interest rate 
regime and a liberal credit policy. It is also not advisable to use the leeway  available to a 
central bank for raising money supply without causing inflation for promoting the 
economy on account of the difficulties encountered by a central bank in determining the 
quantum of the safe money supply growth precisely. But, offering advisory services to 
the government to formulate prudent and sustainable policies for promoting trade and 
investments would help central banks to harmonise and synergise their role as facilitators 
of trade and investment. 
 
NOTES 
   1  A good example in the recent past has been Zimbabwe which had a high money 
supply growth exceeding 250 percent and an inflation of over 500 percent per annum for 
many years: Treasury bill rates went upto over 500 percent per annum and Zimbabwean 
Dollar depreciated from 55 per US $ in 2003 to well over 78000 in December, 2005. 
 2  The best example for this is provided by Singapore which managed to raise its 
per capita GDP from a level below US $ 250 in early 1960s to well over US $ 25,000 in 
2003. Its economic architect, Goh Keng Swee, says that the old guard who formulated 
Singaporean economic policies in early 1960s believed that “….financing budget deficits 
through central bank credit creation appeared to be an invitation to disaster…… The way 
to a better life was through hard work, first in schools, then in universities or polytechnics 
and then on the job in the work place. Diligence, education and skills will create wealth, 
not central bank credit”. “Why a Currency Board” in Prudence at the Helm (1992). 
 
 3  In developed economies, the advancements in payment systems have led to a 
reduction in currency holdings by the public, leading to a gradual rise in the multiplier. 
The same trend has been observed in developing countries as well. For instance, in Sri 
Lanka, the money multiplier stood at about 3 in early 1980s. but in 2005, it has risen to 5. 
